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1 Introduction
The trade-off between offspring quantity and quality (hereafter QQ) is com-
monly acknowledged as one of the driving forces of human fertility. The
seminal work of Gary Becker (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes,
1976) was the first to provide a rationale for the declining fertility rates and
rising income levels observed in developed countries after industrialization.
According to Becker, parents derive utility from both offspring quantity and
quality. Given budget constraints, however, they choose between the number
of children and their human capital in response to the economic incentives
deriving, for example, from income prospects, relative prices, and technolog-
ical change.
In Becker’s model, rising income levels stimulate an increase in fertility
via a substitution effect, because at higher levels of income the elasticity of
income to the quality of children outweighs that related to quantity. Ga-
lor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) argued that the trade-off
crucially depends on technological change, which makes human capital more
profitable thereby leading parents to prefer quality over quantity. This liter-
ature overall implies that economic growth could be detrimental to fertility
via the QQ trade-off.
In these frameworks, the choice between fertility and investments in chil-
dren’s human capital happens endogenously, with simultaneity and omitted
variables bias being the main sources of endogeneity. As a result, empirical
tests struggled identifying causality in the relationship between economic
variables and childbearing decisions (Fernihough, 2017). Not surprisingly,
theories of the QQ trade-off can only partially explain the still declining
trend in fertility during the recent times of crisis and cannot easily be recon-
ciled with recent empirical studies suggesting that the economic insecurity
associated to low growth-scenarios can be a deterrent to childbearing (Ad-
sera, 2011; Modena and Sabatini, 2012; Modena et al., 2014). Overall, the
available evidence suggests that variables so far unexplored by theoretical
and empirical research can play a role in shaping the QQ trade-off in house-
holds’ fertility choices.
This paper offers a new perspective on the trade-off by investigating the
role of an economic variable that has so far not been explored in the fertility
literature: social capital. We argue that families’ demand for human capital
depends not only on conjunctural factors such as income and technological
innovations but also on the economy’s stock of social capital, which takes
decades, or even centuries, to accumulate, is generally persistent over the
short run, and only partially reacts to economic shocks (Guiso et al., 2016).
2
Social capital is a key factor in fostering investments in human capital.
Knack and Keefer, 1997 illustrated why trusting societies have higher re-
turns to the accumulation of human capital. Since trust improves access to
credit, enrollment in higher education may be higher (Karlan et al., 2009).
Trust and civic involvement are linked to better performance of government
institutions, including publicly provided education (Coleman, 1988; Putnam
et al., 1993), thereby raising the quality of schools and increasing the return
to education. By facilitating the enforcement of contracts, both sponta-
neously and through a higher efficiency of enforcement institutions, trust
also increases the return to specialized and vocational education (Knack and
Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2010). Finally, in trusting societies, hiring de-
cisions are more likely to be influenced by talent and effort instead of the
personal attributes of applicants, such as blood ties and personal knowledge
- which are common surrogates of trustworthiness in low-trusting societies -
thereby further increasing the returns to educational achievements (Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
Households’ investment decisions in the human capital of children de-
pend on social capital both directly and indirectly. The direct channel of
transmission is related to the above mentioned social capital’s ability to in-
crease the returns to education. The indirect transmission relies on the fact
that parents’ decisions also depend on their own human capital and on the
economy’s average endowment of human capital, which in turn are affected
by social capital.
To show how these two channels of transmission work, we develop an
overlapping generations model that incorporates the QQ trade-off and the
assumption that social capital plays a key role in the creation of human
capital.
As in traditional QQ frameworks, in our model agents derive utility from
the number of children and their quality, but we also add social interactions
to the sources of utility. Following Galor and Weil (2000), we assume that
the trade-off is influenced by the profitability of investments in education.
Differently from them, we posit that returns to the human capital accu-
mulated by the offspring depend on the existing stock of social capital. In
this scenario, social capital is a public good that incidentally arises as a by-
product of other activities and, as any public good, can be underproduced
by private agents interacting in markets.
We find that a reduction in the level of social capital triggers a chain of
reactions affecting fertility. The erosion of the stock of social capital can lead
the economy into a “social poverty trap” (Antoci et al., 2005; Antoci et al.,
2011; 2013), in which no one spends time on social interaction and human
3
capital can be stuck at a low level or, in the best case scenario, grows at a
slow rate. On the other hand, if the productivity of human capital is low, the
economy will follow a path ending in a “development trap” (Yakita, 2010)
independently of the initial stock of social capital. In both the types of trap,
incentives lead agents to prefer quantity over the quality of the offspring,
resulting in higher fertility.
Our contribution bridges two strands of literature. The first broadly
includes research on the determinants of fertility. After the seminal work
of Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976), several studies
in this field have investigated the substitution mechanism inherent in the
QQ trade-off (Becker et al., 2010; Yakita, 2010; Fernihough, 2017). Others
analyzed the role of education (McCrary and Royer, 2011; Duflo et al., 2015;
Hansen et al., 2017), child policies (Fanti and Gori, 2012; 2014), economic
insecurity (Adsera, 2011; Modena et al., 2014), and technology adoption
(Basso and Cuberes, 2017). We add to this literature by studying the role
of social capital.
The second strand includes studies that have investigated the long run
effects of social capital on economic outcomes such as access to credit (Karlan
et al., 2009), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004), mitigation of agency
problems (Costa and Kahn, 2003), political accountability (Nannicini et al.,
2013), and growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Growiec and Growiec, 2014),
just to name a few. We add to these studies by providing a theoretical
testable prediction of how social capital shapes the QQ trade-off thereby
influencing fertility choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the set up of the
model. Section 3 presents the dynamics of the system. Sections 4 and 5
contain a discussion of results and some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a production economy populated by overlapping generations of
agents who live for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. Time
is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ..., n.
2.1 Individuals
All decisions are made by adults, who choose how much time to devote to
working, rearing children, and social participation - for example through
civic engagement and interpersonal interactions. Parents are “altruistic”, as
they care for the potential earnings of children in time t + 1 and invest in
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their education accordingly (Becker and Tomes, 1976). The rearing time per
child is constant. The higher the number of children the less time parents
ceteris paribus will be able to devote to work. As a result, a higher number
of children will entail a lower income, lower expenditure in the education of
the offspring, and lower savings. For simplicity, we assume that agents only
consume after retirement. Consumption is financed by returns to the savings
accumulated during adulthood (see for example Galor and Weil, 2000). In
addition, we assume that all goods are perishable and that agents can only
transfer value across time by means of capital markets.
To summarize, adults derive utility from the consumption they will enjoy
in the future, from the number of children and their “quality”, and from the
social interactions enjoyed during the time left from work and child rearing,
which hereafter we will call “leisure time”. We finally assume that the utility
of leisure time depends on the stock of social capital and on the amount of
leisure time that is on average enjoyed in society. In fact, spending time on
social participation is more rewarding in a trusting society where the social
environment offers better opportunities of engagement, e.g. if it is richer in
civic networks, the cultural supply is higher and other people devote more
time to social interactions (Antoci et al., 2005; Antoci et al., 2011; 2013).
The lifetime utility of an individual of generation t is represented by the
following function:
Ut = ρlnCt+1 + γlnnt + βlnht+1 +Ksωt ln
(
1 + lpit l¯
1−pi
t
)
(1)
Where Ct+1 is consumption during retirement, nt is the number of chil-
dren, ht+1 is the human capital of the offspring, Kst is the stock of social
capital at time t, lt is the leisure time of adults, and l¯t is the average time
a society devotes to leisure. Parameters ρ, γ, β, and ω are strictly positive,
while pi ∈ (0, 1).
The use of this specification of the utility function respect to the role of
leisure time relies on two reasons. First, it allows the choice of lt = 0 in the
allocation of time (see Antoci et al., 2011; 2013; 2015); on the other hand,
the constant 1 inside the logarithmic function allows to avoid paradoxical
results. In fact, removing 1 from the expression, since lt ∈ (0, 1), it would
be Ksωt ln
(
lzt l¯
1−z
t
)
< 0, i.e. the time needed to produce social capital would
decrease with the stock of social capital.
The budget constraint of adults is:
st = wt (1− ntz − lt)ht − etnt (2)
Where st are agents’ life-cycle savings, wt is the wage rate for labor,
z > 0 is the time devoted to rearing children, and et is per child educational
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expenditure. Given parents’ salary and the interest rate, the cost of edu-
cation distracts resources from future consumption, the number of children,
and leisure time.
Denoting rt+1 the interest rate in the period t+ 1, the budget constraint
of the elderly thus is:
Ct+1 = rt+1 [wt (1− ntz − lt)ht − etnt] (3)
Following De La Croix and Doepke (2003), Yakita (2010), De La Croix
(2013) and Hirazawa and Yakita (2017), we assume that education consists
of two parts: one is the fruit of spillover effects from parents. This compo-
nent does not require additional time to parents and basically depends on
their human capital. The second part relies on the offspring’s learning from
educational institutions, and thereby entails an expenditure that is subject
to budget constraints. In other words, parents delegate the formal education
of the offspring to the educational system (see for example De La Croix,
2013). The average level of human capital in the economy, h¯t, also plays a
role due to spillover effects. In addition, following the social capital literature
(e.g. Coleman, 1988; Knack and Keefer, 1997), we assume that social capital
fosters the accumulation of human capital because it improves the returns
to education, as explained in the Introduction. The human capital of an
individual working in time t+ 1 is thus produced according to the following
function:
ht+1 = ε
(
htθ +Ks
φ
t et
)δ
h¯1−δt (4)
With ε, θ > 0 and φ, δ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter ε indicates the technology
of production of human capital, δ indicates the role of the human capital of
parents and their expenditure for the education of the offspring, 1− δ is the
productivity of the average level of human capital in the economy, and φ
expresses the importance of social capital in increasing the effectiveness of
education.
This formulation implies that social capital plays its role at advanced
stages of development, when a positive share of income is devoted the edu-
cation of the offspring. If agents do not invest in education, social capital
does not play a role in the accumulation of human capital.
The problem for the individual of generation t is to choose savings st,
leisure time lt, the number of children nt, old age consumption Ct+1 and the
educational expenditure et in order to maximize his lifetime utility Ut defined
in (1), subject to (2), (3), (4), and considering h¯t and Kst as given. As in
De La Croix and Doepke (2003), De La Croix (2013) and Yakita (2010),
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in order to guarantee the sufficient optimality conditions, we assume that
γ > βδ. The first-order conditions for maximization and the post-optimality
condition h¯t = ht give the following solutions.
CS1 :

et = 0; lt = 0
nt = n
1 := γz(γ+ρ) ; st =
ρhtwt
γ+ρ
Ct+1 =
ρhtwt
γ+ρ rt+1
if wt < wt, Kst < Ks
(5)
CS2 :

et = 0; lt =
piKsωt −γ−ρ
piKsωt +γ+ρ
nt = n
2 := 2γz(piKsωt +γ+ρ)
; st =
2htρwt
piKsωt +γ+ρ
Ct+1 =
2htρwt
piKsωt +γ+ρ
rt+1
if wt < wt,Kst > Ks
(6)
CS3 :

et = ht
βδwtz−Ks−φt γθ
γ−βδ ; lt = 0
nt =
wtKsωt (γ−βδ)
(γ+ρ)(zKsωt wt−θ) ; st =
htρwt
γ+ρ
Ct+1 =
htρwt
γ+ρ rt+1
if wt > wt, Kst < Ks
(7)
CS4 :

et = ht
βδwtz−Ks−φt γθ
γ−βδ ; lt =
piKsωt −γ−ρ
piKsωt +γ+ρ
nt =
2wtKs
φ
t (γ−βδ)
piwtzKs
ω+φ
t +zwt(γ+ρ)Ks
φ
t −θ(piKsωt +γ+ρ)
st =
2htρwt
piKsωt +γ+ρ
Ct+1 =
2htρwt
piKsωt +γ+ρ
rt+1
if wt > wt, Kst > Ks
(8)
Where Ks := γ+ρpi and wt :=
γθ
zβδ(Kst)φ
are critical levels of the stock
of social capital and wage, respectively. On the one hand, agents invest in
the education of children if and only if the wage is sufficiently high (that is
wt > wt). On the other hand, they devote time to social interactions if and
only if the stock of social capital is above the threshold (Ks > Ks).
As in De La Croix and Doepke (2003), De La Croix (2013) and Yakita
(2010), education increases with income. It is worth noting that this relation
is dynamic, in that it refers to the time-varying condition wt > wt. As in An-
toci et al. (2011), (2013), the time spent on social interaction increases with
the stock of social capital. In a non-trusting society, where people engage
less in interpersonal interactions and public affairs, social participation is less
rewarding, and individuals prefer to spend their time working, as suggested
by Antoci et al. (2005) and Antoci et al. (2011).
In case (5), both the wage rate and social capital fall below the critical
thresholds. Agents do not invest in the quality of the offspring, and neither
do they devote time to social relations.
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If the wage rate lies below the critical threshold but there is enough
social capital in the economy (6), agents do not invest in the quality of
the offspring, yet they devote a positive amount of time to social relations,
thereby contributing to the accumulation of social capital.
In case (7), the wage rate is higher than the critical threshold but the
stock of social capital is low. Agents are incentivized to work more, invest
resources in the human capital of children and do not devote time to social
relations.
If the wage rate and social capital are higher than their critical thresholds
(8), then agents will find it rewarding to invest both in the quality of children
and in social relations. In case (8), agents spend more resources on education
than in case (7), due to the higher returns to education determined by the
stock of social capital.
Figure 1 shows the location of the solutions to the first order conditions
in the space defined by (Kst, wt).
Figure 1: Solutions to the optimization problem respect to wt and Kst.
Apart from the case CS1 in which fertility is constant, fertility decreases
with social capital.
The level of social capital affects fertility choices through two channels.
First, it is the effect of a time constraint. If the stock of social capital is
high, then social participation is more rewarding and agents spend more
time on it (Antoci et al., 2011). As less time is available for rearing children,
households will prefer quality - which, in our model, is not time consuming -
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over quantity. Secondly, social capital increases the productivity of education
in the accumulation of the human capital. As the returns to education are
higher, altruistic parents are encouraged to invest resources in the education
of children. Given budget and time constraints, this entails a preference for
quality over quantity.
2.2 Firms
We assume that there are many competitive producers with the constant-
returns-to-scale production technology. Production in time t employs physi-
cal capital Kt and labor Lt. Denoting Yt the aggregate output, the aggregate
technology of the economy can be represented by the following production
function:
F (Kt, Lt) = AK
α
t L
1−α
t (9)
Where A is the productivity of physical capital. The profit maximization
conditions are given as:
wt :=
A(1− α)Kαt
Ltα
, (10)
rt :=
AαKα−1t
Ltα−1
(11)
2.3 Social capital
Agents consider the stock of social capital as a public good and do not
internalize its accumulation. By deciding the amount of time to devote to
leisure, however, they unintentionally create social capital as a by-product,
as suggested by Coleman (1988).
Social capital evolves according to the following dynamic:
Kst+1 = B(Kst)
λl1−λt + (1− ζ)Kst (12)
Where ζ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1), and B > 0 is a parameter capturing the
productivity of social participation in the accumulation of social capital.
As the time spent on interpersonal interactions creates social capital as
a by-product, social participation prevents the erosion of the stock of social
capital in the long run, as in Antoci et al. (2011; 2013) and Bilancini and
D’Alessandro (2012). By contrast, when the environment is adverse to the
accumulation of social capital (i.e. Ks < Kst), its stock constantly reduces
at a rate (1− ζ) until complete erosion.
Given the assumptions regarding the formation of human capital, indef-
inite growth paths of Kt, Nt and ht are possible. Unlike several previous
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studies (e.g. Agenor and Dinh, 2015), the assumption λ < 1 prevents a per-
petual growth of the stock of social capital. The concept of social capital, in
fact, has mainly been operationalized as trust and civic engagement in the
empirical literature (see Guiso et al., 2010 for a review). At the macro level,
trust is commonly measured as the share of trusting people in a given popu-
lation (see for example Knack and Keefer, 1997 and Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
Civic engagement is measured as the density of civic association (e.g. Put-
nam et al., 1993 and Guiso et al., 2016)1. Both these dimensions are clearly
subject to saturation and their perpetual growth would be implausible.
2.4 Market clearing conditions
The equilibrium condition in the labor market is:
Lt = Nt(1− ntz − lt)ht (13)
Where Nt is the population of generation t. Population evolves according
to the following:
Nt+1 = ntNt. (14)
The equilibrium condition in the capital market is:
Kt+1 = ntst (15)
Equilibrium dynamics are described by a four-dimensional system in
which nt, st, et, lt are determined as in CS1, CS2, CS3 and CS4 and the equa-
tions (4), (12), (13), (14), and (15) hold. Depending on the value of the four
state variables Kt,Kst, Nt, ht, we have four different dynamical systems cor-
responding to the solutions (5), (6), (7), and (8) to the first order conditions.
3 Dynamical systems
From the inspection of the equations describing the equilibrium dynamics, it
can be noted that the dimension of the system can be reduced by introducing
the variable vt defined as the ratio between physical and human capital:
vt :=
Kt
htNt
=
kt
ht
(16)
As a result, we obtain a two-dimensional dynamical system in the vari-
ables vt andKst. Moreover,Kst evolves independently from vt. In particular
1For a critical review on the measurement of social capital see for example Sabatini
(2007).
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at a generic fixed point of the map (v∗,Ks∗) with v∗ > 0 and Ks∗ ≥ 0 we
obtain a balanced growth path at which the physical-human capital ratio
(per agent in the adulthood) and the stock of social capital stay constant.
Moreover by noting that the wage rate can be expressed as
wt =
A(1− α)vαt
(1− ntz − lt)α (17)
it is easy to check that along a balanced growth path also nt, lt, wt and etht
remain constant and the common growth rate for physical and human capital
is determined by (4). In the case in which agents spend positive amounts on
the education of children, we obtain
kt+1
kt
− 1 = ht+1
ht
− 1 =
ε(θ + (K∗s )φ βδwssz − γθ
γ − βδ
)δ− 1 (18)
with wss being the stationary state value of the wage rate; while if agents
do not invest in education, we have
kt+1
kt
− 1 = ht+1
ht
− 1 =
[
εθδ
]
− 1. (19)
It is worth noting that, in both cases, the long run growth rates are positive
if and only if the expressions inside squared brackets are higher than 1. In
addition, in both cases the rate defined in the expression (18) is higher than
the one defined in (19).
By considering the expression in (17), a new threshold vt, corresponding
to the threshold wt, can be defined:
v¯t =
 v
1
t :=
(
γθ
Aβδz(1−α)
) 1
α
ρ
(γ+ρ)Ks
φ
α
if Kst < Ks
v2t :=
(1−ntz−lt)γθ(Ksωpi+γ+ρ)
Ksφβδz(piKsω−γ+ρ) if Kst > Ks.
(20)
According to (20), we obtain the following dynamical systems:
System 1
If both the wage rate and the stock of social capital fall below the respective
critical threshold (allowing for positive investments in the human capital of
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children and social participation), case CS1 holds and equilibrium dynamics
are described by the following system:
S1 :
 vt+1 = A(1−α)v
α
t
(
γ+ρ
ρ
)α
ρz
θδεγ
Kst+1 = (1− ζ)Kst
(21)
valid in the space V1 :=
{
(vt,Kst) ∈ R2+ : vt < v1t and Kst < Ks
}
. Neglect-
ing the state constraints, it is trivial to verify that there exists a unique
(virtual) steady state (v∗1,Ks∗1) for (21), with v∗1 =
(
Aρz(1−α)
εγθδ
(
γ+ρ
ρ
)α) 11−α
and Ks∗1 = 0. In addition, because of the definition of wt, (v∗1,Ks∗1) is feasi-
ble, (that is (v∗1,Ks∗1) ∈ V1).
From the monotonicity of vt+1 respect to vt and the decreasing dynamics
of Kst converging to zero, we have that the steady state (v∗1,Ks∗1) is locally
asymptotically stable.
System 2
Considering the case in which (i) the wage rate falls below the threshold
allowing investment in the human capital of children wt and (ii) social cap-
ital is above the threshold allowing the choice of a positive level of social
participation Ks, CS2 holds and equilibrium dynamics are governed by the
following map:
S2 :
{
vt+1 =
zA(1−α)ρ1−2α(piKsωt +γ+ρ)α
2αεγθδ
vαt
Kst+1 = BKs
λ
t
piKsωt −γ−ρ
piKsωt +γ+ρ
+ (1− ζ)Kst
(22)
that is valid in the space V2 :=
{
(vt,Kst) ∈ R2+ : vt < v2t and Kst > Ks
}
.
Virtual stationary states for map S2 are of the type (v∗2((Ksi)∗, (Ksi)∗),
with (Ksi)∗ being a positive solution of the equation Ks=Bζ
piKsωt −γ−ρ
piKsωt +γ+ρ
. From
the analysis of the social capital dynamics, it follows that there is a threshold
value of B, B, such that for B < B no fixed points exist for the map S2,
while for B > B two virtual fixed points exist, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Such virtual fixed points are feasible if they belong to V2.
Given the monotonicity of (i) vt+1 respect to vt and (ii) Kst+1 respect to
Kst, if two fixed points exist, then the one associated with the lowest (respec-
tively highest) value of Ks is unstable (respectively locally asymptotically
stable). Fixed points with a positive stock of social capital are possible only
to the extent to which social capital productivity is high enough to counter-
balance its depreciation.
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Figure 2: The mechanism leading to the birth of two steady states when
the productivity of social participation is high (Bh > B), or no steady state
when the productivity of social participation is low (Bl < B).
System 3
This case is related to CS3 (the wage rate is above the threshold and social
capital is below it). In this configuration, equilibrium dynamics are governed
by the map:
S3 :
 vt+1 =
ρA(1−α)
((γ+ρ)εnt)(1−ntz−lt)α
(
γ−βδ[
AKsφt v
α
t z(1−α)(1−ntz−lt)−α+θ
]
δβ
)δ
vαt
Kst+1 = (1− ζ)Kst
(23)
valid in the space V3 :=
{
(vt,Kst) ∈ R2+ : vt > v1t and Kst < Ks
}
with lt
and nt defined in CS3.
In this case, there are no feasible fixed points, in that, imposing the sta-
tionary state conditions, no positive value of the investment in education
can be associated to Kst = 0. This system only describes a transitory phase
in which, at a time t, the stock of social capital decreases below the thresh-
old allowing for investments in education. From that time on, equilibrium
dynamics will be described by System 1.
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System 4
This is related to CS4, in which both wt and Kst are above the threshold
allowing for investments in human capital and social capital, respectively.
Equilibrium dynamics are governed by the following equation:
S4 :

vt+1 =
2ρA(1−α)
(1−ntz−lt)α(piKsωt +γ+ρ)εnt
(
γ−βδ[
AKsφt v
α
t z(1−α)(1−ntz−lt)−α+θ
]
δβ
)δ
vαt
Kst+1 = BKs
λ
t
piKsωt −γ−ρ
piKsωt +γ+ρ
+ (1− ζ)Kst
(24)
valid in the space V4 :=
{
(vt,Kst) ∈ R2+ : vt > v2t and Kst > Ks
}
with lt
and nt defined in CS4.
We can notice that the second equation in S4 coincides with the second
one in S2. Therefore we can conclude that the threshold value detected for
the system S2 applies for S4. In particular, for B < B no fixed points exist
for the map S4, while for B > B two virtual fixed points exist (see Figure
2). Such virtual fixed points are feasible if they belong to V4. If two fixed
points exist, the one associated to the lowest value of Ks is unstable. From
the properties of social capital dynamics and of the first derivative of vt+1
in the stationary state, and given the monotonicity of vt+1 respect to vt , we
have that the stability of the fixed point associated to the highest value of
Ks is guaranteed by the condition (1− δ)α ≤ 1−
(
θ
[(Ksi)∗]φwssz
)
.
4 Discussion
The analysis of dynamics shows that the initial stock of social capital plays
a fundamental role in the QQ trade-off, due to its influence on the accumu-
lation of human capital. If the stock of social capital is below the threshold
Ks, the economy will not be able to experience a path in which agents invest
in the human capital of the offspring.
In systems 1 and 3, condition Kst < Ks holds and agents do not invest
their time in social relations. Due to the different speeds in the accumu-
lation of physical, human, and social capital, the economy can experience
transitory phases in which agents invest positive amounts in the education
of children. However, in the long run, the erosion of the stock of social capital
will lead the economy along a dynamic path ending into a social poverty trap
characterized by high fertility and low levels of social and human capital. In
the trap, fertility rises as a result of two transmission mechanisms. The
lack of social capital decreases the returns to education thereby encouraging
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parents to prefer quantity over quality. In addition, as social interaction
is less rewarding, the incentive to spend time on rearing children becomes
stronger. In this scenario, the accumulation of human capital only relies on
the spillover effects from parents to children, and no specific investment is
made for increasing the potential earnings of the offspring in the future.
An initially high endowment of social capital Kst > Ks, however, does
not guarantee that the economy will follow a path resulting in lower fertility
and positive expenditure for education, as there still are further forces that
can lead the economy into a trap. First, the public good nature of social
capital prevents agents from internalizing its positive externalities. The re-
sulting underinvestment could cause a reduction in the stock of social capital
from generation to generation until its complete erosion, which in turn will
cause a reduction to zero of the investments in human capital in the long
run. This last scenario is illustrated in Figure 3, obtained by considering this
parameter set: A = 60; α = 0.33; β = 0.1; γ = 0.3; δ = 0.7; ε = 1; ζ = 0.25;
θ = 1; λ = 0.3; φ = 0.2; pi = 0.52; ρ = 0.1; ω = 0.6; B = 1.3; z = 0.1. In
this case the equation of social capital has two fixed points Ks∗1 ' 0.844 and
Ks∗2 ' 6.24, and the initial conditions are the following: K0 = 0.3, N0 = 1,
Ks0 = 0.8 (< Ks∗1), h0 = 15.5.
In addition, the productivity of human capital also plays a decisive role.
Given our assumptions on the accumulation of human capital (see equation
4), social capital displays its effect only at an advanced stage of development,
in which agents devote resources to the formal education of the offspring. If
the productivity of human capital is too low, no one will spend resources
on education and such an advanced stage of the economy could not even be
reached.
To summarize, social capital can support endogenous growth through
the key role it plays in the accumulation of human capital. However, a
critical level of human capital is in turn needed to switch on the effect of
social capital. In other words, the economy needs human capital to under-
take an endogenous growth path and it needs social capital to make growth
sustainable in the long run, resulting in lower fertility. This result is com-
patible with early sociological theories claiming that human capital (in the
form, for example, of education) is needed to switch on the effect of social
capital. According to Bourdieu (1986), investments in social capital require
human capital, always in highly specific forms. “The reproduction of social
capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of
exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed. This
work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or in-
directly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one
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Figure 3: Time evolution of: total expenditure in education over the parental
income (shet); the growth rate of human capital (ght); the social capital Kst;
the ratio between physical and human capital (per agent in the adulthood)
vt; the number of children nt and the time devoted to social participation lt.
invests in it a specific competence and an acquired disposition to acquire
and maintain this competence” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 250, italic ours). For
example, human capital is needed to understand the potential benefits of
trust and to build bridging and liking connections that can in turn be used
to strengthen the accumulation of all the forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1982;
1986).
Under the same parameter set, if the initial conditions are as follows:
K0 = 0.3;N0 = 1;Ks0 = 3.4;h0 = 15.5, the performance of the economy
over a horizon of 35 generation is described in Figure 4. The economy initially
experiences a period in which no investments are made in education (the
first generation), followed by a persistent phase characterized by positive
educational expenditures for children. Along the trajectory approaching the
stable balanced growth path, identified by (Ks∗2, v∗2) ' (6.23, 1.42), there
is a reduction in fertility rates, an increase in the time devoted to social
participation, and an increase in the amount spent on education, which is
due to the effect of social capital on the returns to education.
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Figure 4: Time evolution of: total expenditure in education over the parental
income (shet); the growth rate of human capital (ght); the social capital Kst;
the ratio between physical and human capital (per agent in the adulthood)
vt; the number of children nt and the time devoted to social participation lt.
In addition, if the economy starts from the system S2 that admits only
one non feasible solution v∗2((Ks1)∗, (Ks1)∗), i.e. (v∗2((Ks1)∗) > v2t ), then
there will be a point at which the economy switches from a regime where no
investments in human capital are made to an endogenous growth phase with
the engine of human capital, or what Galor and Weil (1999; 2000) referred
to as the switch from the “Malthusian” to the “modern growth regime”. This
is because, by making investments in education more profitable and encour-
aging the accumulation of human capital, social capital causes an increase in
wages above the threshold that allows for investments in education, resulting
in a situation in which wt > wt,Kst > Ks and fertility is durably low.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed an overlapping generations model to study the
role of an economic variable that has so far not been explored in the fertility
literature: social capital. Our results highlight two channels through which a
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high stock of social capital might reduce fertility. First, social capital makes
investments in education become more profitable. The higher returns to
education orient the QQ trade-off in favor of quality. This channel is related
to a side effect of social capital on the accumulation of human capital that has
been claimed in several studies (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Bofota et al., 2016) but was never theoretically analyzed in the literature.
Second, the higher productivity of social interaction related to theKst > Ks
scenario creates the incentive to devote more time to social participation,
which has to be detracted from child rearing. This channel is related to the
ability of social capital to make social interaction more rewarding, which was
previously analyzed in growth (Antoci et al., 2011; 2013) and evolutionary
frameworks (Antoci et al., 2005; Antoci and Sabatini, 2018).
The activation of these channels of transmission depends on the struc-
tural parameters of the economy. If the stock of social capital is low, the
economy will fall into a social poverty trap where agents do not invest in
the human capital of their children and fertility rates remain high. A high
level of social capital, however, does not necessarily lead the economy to an
endogenous growth path. Investments in social participation must be high
enough to counterbalance the underinvestment related to the public good
nature of the stock of social capital. In addition, social capital can display
its effect only in the context of a “modern growth regime” characterized by
positive investments in education. If the productivity of human capital is
not high enough and agents have no incentive to invest in the education of
children, the potential role of social capital in the accumulation of human
capital is neutralized and the economy will be stuck in a “development trap”
as in Yakita (2010).
Our work not only contributes to the understanding of the determinants
of fertility. The analysis of dynamics also adds to the literature on the long
run effects of social capital because it reveals that its stock might affect eco-
nomic development through a new mechanism that deserves further research
and policy attention. On the one hand, we provide a theory illustrating how
the QQ trade-off might work as a vehicle of the impact of social capital on the
accumulation of human capital. This contribution has policy implications in
light of the effect of human capital on economic growth (e.g. Barro, 1991;
Growiec, 2010; Ketteni et al., 2011). On the other hand, the possible role
of social capital in the reduction of fertility rates equally has implications
for policy and development in light of the relationship between fertility and
growth (Becker et al., 1990; Barro, 1991; Galor and Weil, 1999; Nakamura
and Seoka, 2013; Strulik, 2018). Future empirical research exploiting longi-
tudinal data is needed to test our predictions and to better understand the
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conditions under which social capital actually displays its effect on human
capital, fertility, and growth.
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